Decisive Point Podcast

U.S. Army War College Public Affairs
  • 4.5 (2)
  • EDUCATION
Decisive Point Podcast

Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs. Questions or feedback? E-mail [email protected]

  1. FEB 20

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-31 – Michael P. Ferguson and Richard Kohn – The American Way of Studying War: What Is It Good For?

    Academic military historians, government institutions, and defense practitioners have unique purposes for advancing the study of war that influence the way they consume and produce history. Although there is substantial scholarship covering how the discipline of military history has changed since the late nineteenth century, the literature surrounding why it changes and how it is used is less plentiful. Using primary and secondary sources to contextualize debates between historians, this study traces major developments in military historiography, considers the US Army’s relationship with its history, and explores potential connections between a history’s purpose and its use for military professionals. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Whig history, New History, American Historical Association, US military history, Society for Military History Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking with US Army Major Michael P. Ferguson and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Professor Richard Kohn about military history. Ferguson is a PhD student and advanced civil schooling participant in the Department of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He’s coauthor of The Military Legacy of Alexander the Great: Lessons for the Information Age, published in 2024. He’s also the author of “The American Way of Studying War: What Is It Good For?” and that’s what we’re here to talk about today. Kohn has focused on military history generally, emphasizing national security and military policy strategy and the American experience with war making and the connections between war, the military, and American society. In recent years, his concentration has been on current civil-military relations, particularly civilian control of the military. Thank you for joining me remotely from North Carolina today. Major Michael P. Ferguson Thanks for having us. Richard Kohn Special pleasure. Host We’re here to talk about why military history remains relevant, and we’re going to talk about its values for individuals, institutions, and society. Why has military history been so controversial? Ferguson It’s probably something that’s not as well known outside the halls of history departments on universities. Military history in general has a pretty turbulent background, and the way I open up the article, which I thought was kind of a fitting alpha, or beginning, to the story of military history is looking at the turn of the century in 1900 and Edward Eggleston, who was the president of the American Historical Association at the time. And, in 190Z, he drafted a speech to be given at the annual conference. Unfortunately, he was never able to deliver it because he fell ill and passed away the following year in 1902. But, his speech touches on this concept of new history and a lot of [lines ] from the speech really reflect this movement of new history—of looking at the smaller things and moving away from classical history, which was essentially “Ivory Tower” history looking at big policies and wars and politics. But, it also reflects this turn-of-century way of thinking at the time, where we’re on the back end of the Enlightenment. Mankind had supposedly liberated themselves from the shackles of predestination. And, you had Darwin’s theories taking traction, and it came out in 1859 on the origin of species. And then, you also had this massive progress in terms of art and science and industry, where it seemed like the sky was the limit at the time. And, one of the outgrowths of this period in the history that Eggleston touches on in his speech is this belief that militarism, in general, and war, specifically, could be something that humankind would essentially evolve out of. It was this anachronistic relic of a past form of human life; this barbaric form that they could educate civilization away from it. That leads into a lot of the themes of why do military historians do history? What’s the purpose of history? And, I want to read one line real quick from his speech because like in any written work, a lot of it ends up on the chopping room floor. But, this is according to Edward Eggleston. This was his purpose, the object of history: Man is such a savage that until the lifetime of the present generation, he has insisted on settling everything by the gauge of battle. But the brute age and age of heroism in the contest with the brute must pass. We cannot always cover our pages with gore. It is the object of history to cultivate this out of man, to teach him the wisdom of diplomacy, the wisdom of avoidance. In short, the fine wisdom of arbitration that last fruit of the human experience, End Quote. The object of history to Eggleston and many other of his contemporaries was, essentially, to weed these remnants of militarism out of human beings. Kohn I would say that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a time when war was being praised as the highest form of human behavior. Heroism changes history. It makes contributions to society. And, it wasn’t really until after World War I, with the horrible killing and no real decision for most of the war that there was a change, I think, in public opinion and among scholars—that war was to be avoided, that it was a mistake. And, it’s controversial because often there are many mistakes made in war. British generals came in for huge criticisms for just wasting human lives by the hundreds of thousands. There was really a turn, I think, in Western society after World War I, that experience that made and still makes war a controversial human endeavor, even though it might illustrate some positive human characteristics. Mike, why don’t you talk about new history because you’ve [covered the] subject so much in your very, I hope, influential article in Army circles. Ferguson Absolutely. New history is kind of a misnomer because it’s not really new at all, but it’s still referred to as “new history.” And, as I mentioned, in Eggleston’s draft of his speech that he was going to give in 1901, he started using this term “new history.” And, he cited, going back to the sixteenth century, a couple examples of other historians who had looked at what he called “the little things in life.” So, social interaction, the everyday life of Americans—from what their bedrooms look like on to the ornate details in their kitchen and their everyday patterns of life. And, part of that concept of new history was that focusing on these things would help create a better citizen. And, that was another thing he mentioned in his speech was that the purpose, the object, of history, was to create good citizens (good men and women) who could contribute to society. And, obviously, the conduct of war and study of war didn’t really fall within that bailiwick of good, kind, productive citizens, especially at a time when a lot of intellectuals were of the mind that they could use reason and logic to essentially extinguish war from the human existence. Kohn I think, [at] this time, military history was equated with war history and with battle. And so, it was being studied, really, once wars began. Perhaps [there was] some study on the causes of war amongst states. And, it was almost considered to be war among states. And that, of course, just touches the most prominent part of military history. It’s as though you can understand elections—we just had one in this country—by only studying the elections. What are the results? Why did someone do this? Why did someone do that? I mean, you can’t understand an election unless you know who’s running, what the issues are, what the background is, what the strategies were, what’s the electorate, what’s at stake. “War is an extension of politics” said the great nineteenth-century student of Carl von Clausewitz. If you don’t understand what’s at stake in a war, if you don’t understand why the sides are fighting each other, how they’re using military institutions, and so on, you really won’t understand war. So, [I think] there was a sense of the need that developed over time in the twentieth century, and what became known as the new military history after World War II, is that if you don’t study it, as Sir Michael Howard said, in length, breadth, and depth, you really won’t understand it. It’s just military institutions clashing and trying to eradicate each other, or at least wound some so that the one side can win and the other side would lose, or there’d be a compromise. Win what? I mean, if you don’t understand, Clausewitz said, the kind of war you are in then you are really lost as military officers and as political leaders, which, in most Western societies now, are the ones that determine the making of war and peace. Ferguson And, I would add to that as the concept of new military history grew in the mid-twentieth century, particularly after 1973 and the institution of the all-volunteer force, a lot of educational institutions and scholars started looking at the question of why serve? Why serve, not only in a peace time when there’s no war being fought? Why serve in an all-volunteer military when there’s no forcing function to get you to put on the uniform? That led to military historians wrestling with a lot of new concepts that really forced them to ask some new questions. And, what it did was broaden the aperture into other disciplines, whether or not internal to the field of history or external to history and political science and communications and other fields, where they started looking more at subjects that were adjacent to military history, not necessari

    29 min

  2. JAN 14

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-30 – Regan Copple – “The Fallacy of Unambiguous Warning”

    The Indications and Warnings subfield of intelligence has traditionally divided warnings into a dichotomy of “ambiguous” and “unambiguous” that gives policymakers a false sense of security. In this episode, Regan Copple examines why unambiguous warning has become an inadequate planning tool that can lead to dire consequences in the quest for certainty. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Podcast record date: November 20, 2024 Keywords: intelligence, military planning, warning, decision making, strategic planning Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I am talking with Regan Copple today, author of “The Fallacy of Unambiguous Warning,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Copple is a research associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, where her work focuses on strategy development and war gaming. She is also a doctoral student at George Mason University. Welcome to Decisive Point, Regan. Regan Copple Thank you. Thanks for having me. Host What are the working definitions of ambiguous warnings and unambiguous warnings in the context of your article? Copple For ambiguous warning, the easy way to break it down is the idea of you know something’s coming, but you’re not quite sure what or when. In practice, this would look like seeing some sort of mass mobilization but not knowing where those forces were mobilizing to or where the first attack might occur. Whereas unambiguous warning, you know something’s going to happen. You know what’s going to happen, when is it going to happen, and how is it going to happen. It sounds super simple, but in reality, this is a really high bar to be able to pin down the exact when and how. A good example of unambiguous warning is the ideal conceptualization of tactical warning about two to three days or a week before an attack would happen. Host How has the traditional distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous warnings contributed to a false sense of security in military planning, and how might this thinking be revised? Copple This distinction isn’t so much of what’s creating the false sense of security, it’s the expectation that you’re going to receive unambiguous warning, which both very recent events like Ukraine and the Hamas attack on Israel, and modern history more broadly—like Pearl Harbor, the Korean War and [the Yom Kippur War] show—is that what’s creating the false sense of security is the idea of we will know when this is going to happen. And, we will know exactly what is coming and when, which hasn’t been true. In terms of how can we reverse this thinking, I’d say we need to start thinking about writing. When we write about unambiguous warning in plans and in our day jobs, rather than think about it as a necessary condition, [we should] start treating it as a “nice to have” rather than a “must have” to further confirm our existing assumptions. Because if we’re waiting for the confirmation that we’re right, that confirmation normally comes in the form of being attacked, which, needless to say, is not a preferred outcome. Host Your article discusses the failure of Israeli intelligence during the Yom Kippur War due to their expectation of unambiguous warnings. What lessons can modern military strategists learn from these kinds of historical intelligence failures? Copple The biggest reason Egypt succeeded in obfuscating their warnings was because they employed an especially well-thought-out deception plan. I think the biggest lesson from this conflict is that adversaries understand the victim state might be watching, so they have an incentive to obscure what they’re actually doing and misrepresent what they’re doing, which means planners and strategists have to factor in responses to deception or contingency plans and think about what happens if the opponent would try and execute some sort of deception. What might this look like? How might we be able to counter that? Basically, the bottom line is don’t expect the enemy to make it easy for you because they have a vested interest in not doing so. Host How can military planners better utilize ambiguous warnings in their intelligence collection and analysis process to avoid surprises like Pearl Harbor or the Yom Kippur War? Copple The biggest take away from Pearl Harbor wasn’t that we didn’t have most of the information we needed to make a decision. We did. The bigger issue was that the right people didn’t have the right information at the right time, in no small part due to security classification issues. Now in 2024, a lot of this has been fixed by technology because now we don’t need to burn letters flown halfway across the world minutes after they’re read. But, the underlying message that remains for today is that information sharing is hard. We shouldn’t assume that everyone gets every piece of information they need the second they need it—and plan around that—and basically understand that institutional bureaucratic stove pipes can get in the way of information sharing and those things are difficult to break down over time.– Host The article suggests that the Intelligence Community’s process is not designed to predict specific events but to assess probabilities. How can decision makers ensure they act on high-probability intelligence without over-relying on the elusive certainty of unambiguous warnings? Copple Much like how lots of the solution rests with changing the way that planners and strategists think about warning, this requires educating decisionmakers inside—but also, mostly outside—the Department of Defense on what do we mean when we say “warning?” Because the DOD has its own very specific language where things that we may say in our day-to-day jobs may mean something very, very different to a person with no previous defense experience or very little defense experience. We also need to talk about what a given probability means. What does a low-confidence assessment mean? What does a high-confidence assessment mean? What are some of the implications of that? And also, educate that just because we don’t have unambiguous warning, that doesn’t mean something isn’t going to happen. That just means that we don’t have a crystal-clear picture on what we think is going to happen next. Both the beauty and the curse of this problem is primarily that it’s a solution that’s driven by a mindset change. It’s a beauty in that it doesn’t cost us any money or people to make this change, which is nice. But, at the same time, it’s a curse in that entrenched beliefs within the DOD and the national security establishment are incredibly hard to dislodge once those beliefs have been established. Host We have a few extra minutes if you’re willing to entertain another question or two. I’d love to know what inspired you to write this article. Copple A few years ago, I was sitting in some planning discussions out in INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command], and some of the planners at the table looked around and they said, “Hey, you know, maybe we should define unambiguous warning in the document so that way everybody in the future knows and it’s clear, that they understand what we meant when we wrote this.” Everybody at the time thought that was a great idea. So, then everyone started to share what to them looked like unambiguous warning. And, what started off as a very civil, casual discussion very quickly turned into a very acrimonious argument, and by the very end, everyone was further apart in understanding what unambiguous warning meant, not closer together. That sort of prompted me to think if there are so many different views on what unambiguous warning is, is it really unambiguous? And, that’s what really sparked my research—and looking at case studies and realizing that there’s a trend here. What I experienced wasn’t just a one-off conversation. Host Once you started researching it, did you find any surprises or unexpected information? Copple I think the underlying thread that I found the most was that a lot of the most successful surprise attacks have a very big deception component where it’s not just that the victim state misses something altogether. That’s normally not what happens. There’s normally some sort of active deception and obfuscation going on on the part of the attacking state. Host Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share? Copple Bottom line: warning is hard, and I think we forget that sometimes. We tend to think as long as we check off every box on a list of things we observe, that means we have a certain level of warning, and we know what’s going to happen based off of that list. It doesn’t. We not only have to think about what we’re seeing, but why are we seeing what we’re seeing? What other explanations or adversary motivations could be out there that’s driving the adversary to make those decisions, or those maneuvers, and figure out are we falling into some sort of mental trap? Are they doing what we expect them to do? And, if they’re not, maybe why not? And, think through all of this because once we do, we’re going to get a little bit closer to understanding the true picture of what’s going on. Host Thank you for making time to speak with me today. I really enjoyed it. Copple Thank you. Pleasure to be here. Host Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

    10 min

  3. JAN 6

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-29 – Richard D. Hooker Jr. – “Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal”

    In this episode, Richard D. Hooker argues that the historical assessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II lacks objectivity and balance. While we will never know if other generals would have outperformed Eisenhower, several leaders were available—all senior to Eisenhower at the outbreak of the war and with superior professional résumés. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Podcast record date: November 7, 2024 Keywords: Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II, strategy, command, Joint campaign Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm talking with Richard D. Hooker today, the author of “Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Hooker is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and senior associate at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. He is the former National Security Council senior director for Europe and Russia and authored The High Ground: Leading in Peace and War, which was published by Casemate in 2023. Welcome to Decisive Point, Richard. Richard D. Hooker Thank you. It's great to be here. Host How did Eisenhower’s lack of prior combat command experience affect his performance as Supreme Allied Commander? Hooker Well, I think first of all, it is important to give some credit where credit is due. Eisenhower began the war as a lieutenant colonel and rose in some 23 months to four stars. As the Supreme Commander he superintended, really, the largest Joint campaign in probably military history up to that point, which was ultimately successful in a little over 10 months. So, that’s a major achievement. I think what we’re wrestling with here [is] was he the best qualified person, and how did his background help him or hinder him in the performance of those remarkable duties? And, I think it’s fair to say that although he was clearly a highly intelligent and experienced middle-grade officer, the lack of professional experience in command of larger formations—and probably a lack of combat experience, as well—didn’t serve him as well as it otherwise might have done. There were other officers, in my opinion, who were far more experienced and senior who possibly could have done a little bit better job, and we can talk about that as we go forward in this discussion. Host Sure, I’m looking forward to hearing about that. Tell me, what were some of the key strategic errors that are attributed to Eisenhower, and how did they affect the course of the war? Hooker I think there are a number of those that are discussed in the article in Parameters and most of them have to do, in my opinion, with seizing or not seizing opportunities. So, the first major error that I see in the European campaign in 1944 is a missed opportunity to trap two German field armies at Falaise during the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. At this time, Eisenhower is still in the UK [United Kingdom], and the overall ground commander is [British General Bernard Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group]. So, I think it's fair to say that Eisenhower did not exert, really, a firm grasp of the operations that were going on at that time. There was a golden opportunity to close the gap at Falaise and trap a large number of German soldiers who, unfortunately, were able to escape and then form the basis for reconstituted units later on, which of course prolonged the war, and were directly responsible for many, many more Allied casualties. The second opportunity, I think, had to do with the failure to open the port of Antwerp, which was essential for the logistical support of the campaign after the breakout from the Normandy beachhead in the bocage. Although the British actually captured Antwerp early in September of 1944, the long estuary leading out to the North Sea, some 54 miles, was not cleared of German troops as Montgomery attempted to press forward. This resulted in an inability to open up Antwerp—really, one of the major ports in all of Europe at the time. And it caused the campaign to stall for logistical reasons at a time when even the German commanders in their post-war memoirs felt that it would have been fairly easy to rupture the entire front and drive deep into Germany. So, I think that was the second major strategic misstep. The third, in my opinion, was Market Garden, which was the audacious attempt to seize the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem, which for a number of reasons was unsuccessful. Eisenhower himself described himself as an ardent supporter. He said he didn’t have to be convinced to approve the operation. But, for a number of reasons, it failed, and the Germans remained in control of that sector and of that bridge, really, all the way through April of 1945. As a number of historians have pointed out, [it was] a real strategic disappointment. Perhaps the fourth major strategic misstep was the terrible, painful, and very costly battle fought in the Hürtgen Forest through the fall and early winter of 1944. [It was] really one of the longest ground battles ever fought by the US Army in Europe [and] resulted in very, very high casualties for very limited gain. I think the official historians have pointed out [that it] was really a battle that didn’t need to be fought and ended up having very, very high costs on American soldiers. Little known to many is an opportunity for Eisenhower’s forces to cross the Rhine in, uh, late November, early December of 1944. So, if you’ll recall, [General Jacob L. Devers] 6th Army Group coming up from southern France following Operation Dragoon actually reaches the Rhine in mid-November of 1944 and makes preparations to cross the river and enter into Germany, which, in all probability, would have disrupted the Ardennes counteroffensive, the Battle of the Bulge, which happened shortly thereafter. He pleaded with Eisenhower for permission to cross the Rhine with his army group, but that permission was denied, and that opportunity was, in my opinion, squandered. And so, a month later, we find ourselves in the middle of the Battle of the Bulge, again with very, very heavy US casualties—and arguably a needless battle that could have been avoided or prevented. That takes us to what I saw as this sixth strategic misstep, which was the Bulge itself. It has to be accounted a major intelligence failure for the Germans to mass almost 30 divisions without the knowledge of the Allies doesn’t speak well to our intelligence apparatus. There’s reason to believe that intelligence officers were always cautious about predicting the chances of German counterattacks because of the wave of euphoria that had sort of swept Eisenhower’s headquarters at that time. At any rate, the Battle of the Bulge does happen. The Ardennes, counteroffensive, again, inflicting very, very heavy casualties on US troops, in particular—really not on Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, which suffers very, very few, almost 20,000 US fatalities in the Battle of the Bulge, which is a very high number. But, the Bulge represented an opportunity as well. It was a very large, very deep penetration, which, if it had been countered aggressively, as Patton argued, by strong attacks on the northern and the southern flanks of the penetration, again, another opportunity to cut off and bag several hundred thousand German soldiers. That’s not what happens. Eisenhower finds himself unable to get Montgomery to attack aggressively from the north, and the Germans are essentially pushed back from west to east. They fall back in something like good order, and the campaign continues for another five or six months. So very briefly, those are the six major missteps that I saw in the campaign that I think can be fairly attributed to Eisenhower’s generalship, as he himself pointed out in his memoirs and in his letters to General [George C.] Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, he assumed the supreme authority for all the decisions that were made in the campaign, and I argue, therefore, bears responsibility for these decisions as well. Host So, you mentioned earlier about Montgomery and I’m curious about how Eisenhower’s relationship with British commanders like Montgomery might have influenced Allied operations and campaign outcomes. Hooker Eisenhower, of course, is often lauded as being, sort of, a very accomplished military diplomat, but actually, his relations with Montgomery, in particular, were very strained and problematic. Although only three years older than Eisenhower, Montgomery, of course, was vastly more experienced and senior than Eisenhower at the outbreak of the war. [He was] badly wounded in World War I, commanded at the division and the corps in the Army and, ultimately, Army group level. And, as some stories have pointed out, Eisenhower was painfully aware of his lack of credentials when compared to others like Montgomery. So, through the course of the campaign, he finds it very difficult to impose his will on the field marshal. I’ve cited some of the examples of that at Falaise and the opening of the port of Antwerp and during the Battle of the Bulge. During the war, Montgomery never attended any of the staff conferences that Eisenhower held for the Army and Army group commanders, always sending his chief of staff instead. So, I think this was really problematic for the campaign because in a number of instances there were real opportunities to inflict decisive defeats on the German army that would have hastened the end of the war and saved tens of thousands of lives. And, Eisenhower is just unable to, as I said, impose his will on Montgomer

    13 min

  4. 12/12/2024

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-28 – Colin D. Robinson – “Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective”

    In this episode, Colin D. Robinson discusses American and Western liberal ideas (ideological views) and politics in relation to the obstacles faced in rebuilding the Afghan and Iraqi armies. This podcast reviews the differences between Western liberal democracies and partner states, the politics of counterinsurgency, and army accounts.   E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.   Podcast record date: September 26, 2024   Keywords: liberal peace, Afghan National Army, Iraqi Army, security sector reform, security force assistance   Episode transcript   Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me virtually today is Colin D. Robinson, author of “Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Robinson lectures on defense leadership and management at Cranfield Defense and Security at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, United Kingdom. He began his tracking of Operation Enduring Freedom while at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC, in 2002. Welcome to Decisive Point, Colin. Colin D. Robinson Thank you so much. Host In your view, what were the most critical structural weaknesses that led to the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi armies? How could these have been addressed more effectively by their respective governments or allied forces? Robinson The structural weakness was politics. Iraq was split between Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. And, the parties interested in the Afghan army were split between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks and less-than minorities and networks of political party affiliation in the armed forces, which led to different political parties having the loyalty and patronage and financial links to different sets of generals within what was the Afghan National Army. One of the other critical points was the disbandment of the Iraqi army under Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA] Order No. 2, which has historically now been seen as an enormous, enormous mistake. There were plans in place to use the existing remnants of the Iraqi army that still existed by the time Baghdad had fallen, and US Army senior leaders were liaising with their generals. The most recent research I have seen attributes the origins of CPA Order 2, potentially, to Ahmed Chalabi, clearly through Ambassador Paul D. Bremer. The question is, did the United States try to set up a mirror-image state army along the lines of Western armies or try to build forces that took more account of the political realities? In thinking about this, one has to remember that the Kurdish forces, now, in what is the Kurdish zone of Iraq, are still split down the middle between two separate factions. Host Some have attributed the failure of these armies to issues of leadership, issues of corruption. How much responsibility do you think should be placed on these internal factors compared to the external military pressures? Robinson General Colin Powell, later Secretary of State, had something he called a “Pottery Barn rule.” You break it, you own it. So, at least equal responsibility can be divided between the United States and its allies, including the United Kingdom, and on the other side, Iraqi and Afghan actors because the United States firstly created the whole Iraqi mess in 2002 and 2003 for no real justifiable reason, as we now know, in my view. And secondly, as [State Department representative Carter] Malkasian and [David] Kilcullen and Mills have noted, the United States and its allies did not bring one of the most important actors, the Taliban, to the key Bonn Afghan peace conference of 2002. If the Taliban had been at that conference, the result might have been very, very different. Now, that’s the external military factors or external political factors. In terms of internal factors, leadership and corruption issues had been endemic in Afghanistan and Iraq since they were established. They were very much patrimonial states. They work along the lines of a father ruling his family with, to some degree, an iron hand. They’re low-trust societies. Less than 10 years of very bloody US-led presence in Iraq, or 20 years in Afghanistan, had very little hope of changing that. To sum up again, basically, at least equal responsibility between the interveners, the United States and its allies, and Iraq and [Afghanistan], different feuding political actors. Host Taking into consideration the lessons from the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi armies, what changes in strategy should be implemented in current—or future—US military interventions to avoid similar outcomes? Robinson Since about the 1960s, large-scale Western democratic states have tried to do counterinsurgency in several states after they gained independence. After independence in places like South Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, it does not seem to work. There are too many political compromises. The selected local leader, client leader, does not want to do what the United States wants. It does not seem to be successful. Perhaps the most recent clearest example of this is Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. The thing is, this was not well understood or potentially well understood because during the colonial period, this is something that Richard Holbrook pointed out, it could and sometimes did work. The usual standard example of the British in Malaya, the British in Kenya, to some extent, the suppression and eventual resolution of the [Hukbalahap] insurgency in the Philippines immediately after the Second World War, assisted by the United States. So, what changed in strategy? Firstly, do not try large-scale expeditionary Western counterinsurgency in client states, in partner states. It just doesn’t seem to work. For smaller-scale efforts, the State Department should be much more in the political driver’s seat. They should be building the political roads, supervising the political activities for overseeing things for the competent commands and involving, yes, the Department of Defense and the implementation, more the State Department overseeing, and potentially, even the Agency for International Development, which did wonders in Yugoslavia after the Second World War, supporting Yugoslavs when the US was allied with them. The Bosnia train and equip program is a good working example of how the State Department implemented the program properly. I have to say with some sorrow that the Department of the Army is really not particularly well placed to plan and run assistance programs. [It has] too much focus on technical specifications and not enough on politics, which made and broke the Afghan and Iraqi armies. The temptation to put together a program plan and then push it together, push it through, virtually at all costs, should be resisted firmly. Host So where do we go from here? How do the failures of these armies reflect the broader challenges of nation building in conflict zones? Is there a way for external forces like the United States to foster sustainable military institutions in these kinds of environments? Robinson State building, what you could call fixing failed states, unquote, has proven very, very difficult in these very, very deeply split conflict zones. Literally, the book called Fixing Failed States: [A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World] was cowritten by Ashraf Ghani, who became president of Afghanistan and then lost to the Taliban. Analysts are moving beyond this kind of, “liberal peace,” paradigm. There needs to be a little bit more of an ability and a willingness to accept and work with other actors, non-state actors, the political forces that don’t necessarily fit in the state or Western Europe or North America’s view of the state. To try and generate some kind of peace and prosperity, but potentially, case by case, to leave state structures out of it. So, no. External forces like the United States cannot necessarily at all foster sustainable military institutions in countries ripped apart by decades of war and oppression. Afghanistan and Iraq are a good example. Another potentially similar example is the decades of effort by France to support former colonies in Africa, which has just had somewhat of a similar backlash in the three countries in Niger and Burkina Faso [and] Mali, where their efforts have just led to yet another military coup. We have a whole lot more stable countries, [where it is] much easier to help because we have much more to work with, but if we’re wanting to work in places like Somalia, which appear to be strategically critical, be prepared to work with non-state actors or militia. Host Unfortunately, we’re out of time here. I do have time for one more question, though, if you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share with us. Robinson I said before, do less interventions. Often, do not go. Focus on more stable countries where there are strong forces to work with. The United States actually doesn’t have to run the entire world. Climate change will create more problems and pressure for deployments. So, aspirations, as far as I can tell, will have to be scaled back over time as climate disasters increase in number and forces are needed more closer to home. Host Thank you for making time to speak with me today, Colin. Robinson Thank you so much for listening. Host Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

    10 min

  5. 12/04/2024

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-27 – Michael T. Hackett, John A. Nagl – “A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023”

    In this episode of Decisive Point, authors Michael T. Hackett and John A. Nagl delve into insights from the article “A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023.” They analyze the evolution of warfare tactics between the first and second year of the Russia-Ukraine War, highlighting the shift from rapid maneuvers to trench warfare characterized by saturation and attrition. The discussion emphasizes the significance of adaptability for military strategists in the United States and NATO, particularly in response to Russia’s strategic use of mercenaries like the Wagner Group. Hackett and Nagl explore the implications of a transparent battlefield shaped by modern technologies and the contrasting command structures of Ukraine and Russia, showcasing the effectiveness of decentralized command. Additionally, the critical role of airpower and the future of Ukraine in the context of Western support are key themes, underscoring the vital lessons for contemporary military strategists. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Podcast record date: September 5, 2024 Keywords: culture, human domain, cross-cultural competence, military education You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Dr. John A. Nagl today and joining us virtually is Michael T. Hackett. Nagl and Hackett are the authors of “A Long, Hard Year, Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023,” which was published in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Nagl, the director of the Russia-Ukraine War integrated research project, is a retired Army officer and a professor of war-fighting studies at the US Army War College. Hackett is a foreign service officer at the US Department of State and served as the chief of staff for the integrated research project that studied the second year of the Russia-Ukraine War. He is a distinguished graduate of the US Army War College class of 2024. Welcome to Decisive Point, John and Mike. Dr. John A. Nagl Thank you, Stephanie. It’s good to be with you. Michael T. Hackett Great to be here. Host Let’s just jump right in and get started here. How has the approach to war and its tactics changed from the first-year study of the war to the second-year study? Nagl I’ll take that if I can. I was asked by General [Paul E.] Funk and the Training and Doctrine Command during the first summer of the Russo-Ukrainian War [Russia-Ukraine War] to try to examine that war for lessons learned for the Training and Doctrine Command of the US Army, which General Funk then led, and started the academic year that graduated in 2023 by looking then at the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian War [Russia-Ukraine War] over the course of 2022. And, Mike and I have now authored a study that is a capstone to a broader study of the second year of the war. And, I think I’d characterize the first year of the war as a war of maneuver. It was the year that Russia invaded and then that Ukraine counterattacked, broadly speaking, erasing the majority of Russia’s gains from the first month of the war. And so, the first year studied a war of movement. The second year of the war, the year 2023, covered in the article that Mike and I have published, was much more a static war. It was a war of trenches. It was a war of a failed Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023. And so, the lessons we learned from the first year of the war were very different than a lot of the lessons—not all, but a lot of the lessons—we learned during the second year of the war. And ironically, we are now in academic year 2025, studying the war as it happens in 2024. And, with the Kursk incursion by Ukraine, we’re again seeing a war of movement. And so, the war keeps changing, the Russians and the Ukrainians keep learning and adapting, and our hope is that the American Army and the US military [will] learn and adapt as well from these changing lessons of a changing war. Host Thanks, John. Mike, how has Russia’s approach to utilizing mercenaries impacted its broader military strategy in the conflict? And what lessons can be drawn from this for future conflicts involving state and non-state actors? Michael T. Hackett One of the most significant aspects of the second year of the war was Russia’s increased use of mercenaries—of private military companies, or PMC—particularly the Wagner Group, culminating in the failed mutiny last June by [Wagner founder Yevgeny] Prigozhin and his death two months later. So, our Norwegian international fellow on the team focused exclusively on this topic and looked not only at the history of Wagner, but also the tactics and the degree to which their approach has altered Russian force structure in the long term. In his review, he looked at two components of the Wagner PMC, zeki, which is short for zaklyuchënnyi, or prisoners, and osvovy, which are the foundational elements of that unit. And, the zeki’s are prisoners who were brought in through a service agreement, and the osvovy were trained professional fighters with experience in Syria and Africa. Now, on the battlefield, this meant that Wagner used the zeki as assault units, the so-called “Storm Z” units, which are sheer mass of numbers just to throw at the enemy, while the osvovy, the trained soldiers, were left to consolidate the gains. And, in doing so, despite the heavy casualties among the zeki, Wagner was able to maintain his long-term capabilities, leaving command elements and experienced soldiers protected and able to continue to fight. So, the Russians used this approach to counter an increasingly transparent battlefield—one with drones and space and electronic warfare—made massing and concentrating attacks very difficult. Wagner used these assault tactics with bursts of massive expendable forces followed by a consolidation of gains with trained soldiers to successfully grind down the Ukrainians in that second year in battles like the one in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. And, even with the death of Prigozhin and the folding in of Wagner into regular Russian units, we’re seeing the Russian army adopt this approach into the tactics of its regular armed forces and even using it to alter the military’s force structure. So obviously, in TRADOC, Training and Doctrine and Command, we need to look carefully at ways to approach an adversary that’s willing to take these heavy losses with these assault tactics and one that may not feel encumbered by [the] law of armed conflict. Both are really a significant shift and one that we need to be ready for. Host The article highlights the impact of persistent surveillance on the battlefield. How has this transparency affected traditional combat doctrines, and what innovations are necessary to counteract these changes? Nagl So, Mike talked a little bit about the transparent battlefield, and this is the idea that there’s an unblinking eye—largely drones, but also satellites and various electromagnetic systems that produce an unblinking eye—that make it essentially impossible to mask the forces that are necessary to conduct breakthrough-level attacks. And, the idea of that chapter was that a lot of the work we did during the second year of the war’s study was [documenting] that this technology changed the character of war. That was one of the reasons we attributed to the failures of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of ’23 [2023], and that was one of the conclusions we drew. And then, just as we published the article, the Kursk invasion happens and, all of a sudden, Ukraine has found ways to adapt, to conceal movement, to use surprise, to somehow manage to mass the forces that allowed a breakthrough of Russian lines in a place where, admittedly, Russian lines were weak and seize a fairly extraordinary amount of Russian territory in fairly short order. And, we’re still trying to figure out—this is one of the things we’re going to examine in this year’s study—why and how it was that Ukraine was able to succeed. One of the early explanations appears to be that although Russia saw the massing of forces, they couldn’t understand why Ukraine would attack in that direction. There were no immediately apparent strategic goals in the direction of Kursk. They couldn’t imagine Ukraine, which was under enormous pressure defensively further south, would use its forces in an offensive manner. This is one of the questions I’m most interested in. It’s one of the questions that I’m looking forward to digging into this year, but it’s another example, to me, of the way that armies learn and adapt at a very rapid pace on the battlefield. They make mistakes, but under the pressure of combat, and, for Ukraine, under the pressure of national survival. And arguably for Russia, at least for Putin, this is also a war of survival at this point. We saw the Wagner mutiny spooking Putin. Both armies are working hard to gain an advantage over their adversary, and I’m reminded, really, of some of the innovations during World War I that led to, for instance, ultimately, the invention of the tank, the harnessing of the internal combustion engine to machine guns or to cannons and to armor that restored mobility to the battlefield. And, one of the interesting things for me is that the tank has been declared dead a number of times in the Ukraine war [Russia-Ukraine War], and, what the Kursk incursion clearly shows is that its demise has been sadly over-reported to date. Host The article suggests the need to foster a culture of mission command. How can military organizations effectively cultivate this culture, especially in a high-intensity conflict like Ukraine? Hackett To John’s point, talking about the Kursk incur

    15 min

  6. 11/21/2024

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-26 – Daniel W. Henk and Allison Abbe – "Restoring Priority on Cultural Skill Sets for Modern Military Professionals"

    In this episode, Colonel Daniel W. Henk (US Army, retired), PhD, and Dr. Allison Abbe discuss cultural education in the US military. They emphasize the importance of cultural capability across the competition and conflict continuum and address how the Department of Defense can build on service culture centers’ efforts to address the LREC skills military personnel need to work effectively across cultural boundaries, whether during conflict against an adversary or in interoperability with allies and partners. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Podcast record date: August 27, 2024 Keywords: culture, human domain, cross-cultural competence, military education Episode transcript Stephanie Crider (host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm talking remotely with Colonel Daniel W. Henk and Dr. Allison Abbe, authors of “Restoring Priority on Cultural Skill Sets for Modern Military Professionals,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Henk, US Army retired, holds a PhD in social anthropology. His research interests include peace operations, human and environmental security, and civil-military relations. He was the founding director of the Air Force Culture and Language Center. Abbe is a professor of organizational studies and the Matthew B. Ridgway Chair of Leadership Studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on [the] development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security leaders. Welcome to Decisive Point, Dan and Allison. COL Dan Henk (US Army, retired) Thank you. Dr. Allison Abbe Thanks for hosting. Host Why are human relations skills important to US military operations or partnerships in today’s culturally complex environments? And, if you could, briefly cite a couple of specific examples to illustrate your answer. Henk A compelling argument could really be made that in conflict in the early twenty-first century, managing human relations has risen to a level of importance that we’ve never seen before. And for the military professional, doing the nation’s business really now means an ability to understand and to work very well with very diverse communities under the constant scrutiny and instant reporting of the information age and, often, unfortunately, with malign actors waiting and watching for our missteps. Poor command of human relations skills could very easily lead to mission failure at any level of responsibility and across the entire spectrum of military involvements. If you don’t mind, let me just offer a couple of examples. In 2004, not long after our latest intervention in Iraq, a very perceptive young Marine documented American military deficiencies in working across cultural boundaries at the tactical level in Iraq. His article appeared in Small Wars Journal and was titled “Marines Are from Mars, Iraqis Are from Venus.” He made the point, based on his observation, that it is very difficult to work with people when you are clueless about their take on reality, about their norms, about their values, about their expectations, and about their grievances and their insecurities. But, you know, the same thing is true at a higher level, as well. In my role as an attaché and a researcher, I frequently overheard comments by host nation officials describing US military connections. Some were complimentary, to be sure. Many were not. In fact, American military personnel were really often characterized as impatient, insensitive to local dynamics, and much more inclined to operate on transmit than on receive. Now, the fact of the matter is a grounding in the more advanced skills of cross-cultural competence could have been a considerable help—both in avoiding offense and in discerning the true nature of the relationships. We have had senior officials that have displayed really commendable cross-cultural skills at very high levels of responsibility. Particularly noteworthy were [Special Presidential Envoy] Robert Oakley and Director of Operations Marine General Anthony Zinni in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in ’92 and ’93. These two men were true cross-cultural adepts. They were able to reconcile and work with extraordinarily diverse and difficult actors in one of the world’s most problematic conflict environments. They reached out, they communicated well, they reconciled hostile factions, and they achieved a remarkable cooperation. Sadly, their UN [United Nations] successors had no such motivation or capability, and their American peers generally lacked their cross-cultural proficiency. The point here, again, is that the military profession in the twenty-first century will succeed or fail based on its ability to understand opponents, appeal to the uncommitted, and work effectively with partners and allies. And, cross-cultural competence is key to these capabilities. Abbe Looking forward, the National Defense Strategy does really rely on allies and partners in this strategy. And so, developing those relationships at all levels, from the tactical to strategic, is really important for success, especially in our relationships in the Pacific, where we might not have had the same level of experience, where military personnel serving now all have experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, now, we are looking to the Pacific, where they may not have as much cultural awareness or cultural knowledge. So, we need to rebuild that in personnel for another theater. And, more broadly, just for the strategy and facing all of our potential adversaries and competitors, it would be important to incorporate these cultural skills that we talk about in the article. Host The Department of Defense has identified language, regional expertise, and culture—the LREC rubric—as a body of related essential skills. Yet, you’ve chosen to focus on culture and, even more specifically, on cross-cultural competence. How do these skill sets relate, and why does your discussion single out culture? Henk Well, there has been, since the early twenty-first century, a new DoD focus on this new paradigm of LREC—language, regional expertise, and culture. Behind this formula is actually the explicit assumption that these are mutually reinforcing skills. We fully agree with that. Absolutely. But, imagine the best of all worlds—a military professional deploys to a contingency environment fluent in the local language, having a detailed knowledge of the region, [and] steeped in cross-cultural expertise. Of course, if these skills could be combined and harnessed in one person, he or she would have an unmatched ability to impact the social environment. But, you know, that combination is an absolutely optimum scenario. It is conceivable but is very far from likely—simply because of the limitations of time and resources and human capacity. It is much more probable that real fluency in foreign languages and pockets of deep regional expertise will continue in our system to reside largely in specialized communities accessed as needed. That being the case, here are a couple of observations. Our need for foreign language speakers is so obvious that it hardly requires comment, and language-enabled service personnel are worth every penny we spend on them. And, we could do more—and should. But, no matter what inducements we use, we will never fully satisfy the language demand, particularly the requirements for sudden, newly needed languages. We all know that military professionals are not all able to learn languages or to learn them well, and very few of us will learn enough different languages to cover all likely contingency environments to which we may be sent. Now, the same holds true for regional knowledge, actually. It is valuable stuff. We should produce more of it. But, when it’s held by one person, it’s simply not going to stretch far enough and deep enough to cover even the predictable, let alone the unforeseen, in the worldwide responsibilities of the general-purpose forces. The fact is we are devoting substantial resources to both language and regional expertise, but these two skill sets, despite their value, have significant limitations. That’s why, for us, the long pole in the human-relations tent has to be cross-cultural competence. Sure, that competence would be immensely enhanced if supported by language fluency and regional expertise in the right place and time—and again, if these were available. But of the three, cross-cultural competence is the only generalized set of skills that could be used anywhere. It’s the only set that could be instantly available. That’s why cross-cultural competence is an astute investment. If we can produce it, you can be absolutely assured we will use it everywhere all the time. Abbe I just want to emphasize that point about how difficult it is to scale language proficiency very rapidly—even getting personnel to limited proficiency for operations takes [a] substantial amount of time. And so, being able to scale that, as we found in previous conflicts, there’s just so many limitations on it. So, we’re not arguing against language skills per se but arguing for a more scalable skill set in helping personnel understand cultures and how to make sense of other cultures wherever it is that they find themselves in deployments. Henk  Well, most Western military establishments, certainly including our own, could offer at least occasional examples of senior leaders with remarkable cross-cultural skills. Anthony Zinni, we’ve already mentioned is a case in point. We have had these examples of people who could do this stuff very, very well, but they did it as an art. Their background [and] maybe their experience all contributed to their personal ability

    16 min

  7. 11/06/2024

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-25 – C. Anthony Pfaff – “Avoiding the Escalatory Trap: Managing Escalation During the Israel-Hamas War”

    In this episode, Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, interim director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, discusses his work on managing escalation during the Israel-Hamas War. The conversation covers the complexities of Israel’s deterrence strategies, the proposed ceasefire, and the implications of Hamas’ potential power dynamics akin to Hezbollah. Pfaff highlights the delicate balance required in deterring Iranian support for Hamas and the importance of diplomatic efforts in establishing sustainable ceasefire conditions and examines how Israel’s strategies can inform global conflict resolution, offering insights into the intricate dynamics of military and diplomatic engagement in international relations. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Podcast record date: September 5, 2024 Keywords: Israel, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Israeli Defense Forces, violent extremist organizations Download the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/06/2003579418/-1/-1/0/DP5-25-PFAFF-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

    9 min

  8. 11/05/2024

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-24 – Steven Metz – “The Challenges of Next-Gen Insurgency”

    In this episode, Steven Metz discusses his article, “The Challenges of Next-Gen Insurgency,” which was published in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. We discuss how generational conflict may drive future insurgencies, particularly tensions between youth and older generations fueled by frustration and radical ideologies. Metz emphasizes the importance of narrative control in modern cybersecurity and information warfare, suggesting that this shift will redefine counterinsurgency strategies. He also explores how insurgents increasingly focus on undermining state authority, presenting challenges for state responses. This conversation urges a reevaluation of traditional counterinsurgency methods to better address evolving threats, with Metz’s insights set to be further detailed in his forthcoming book. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Record date: 22 August 2024 Keywords: insurgency, Cold War, people’s war, Mao Zedong, social media, al-Qaeda Download the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/05/2003578522/-1/-1/0/DP5-24-Metz-Transcript.PDF

    8 min
See All (150)

Ratings & Reviews

4.5
out of 5
2 Ratings

About

Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs. Questions or feedback? E-mail [email protected]

Information

  • Creator
    U.S. Army War College Public Affairs
  • Years Active
    2023 - 2025
  • Episodes
    150
  • Rating
    Explicit
  • Copyright
    © Copyright 2025 Decisive Point Podcast
  • Show Website
    Decisive Point Podcast

You Might Also Like

To listen to explicit episodes, sign in.

Stay up to date with this show

Sign in or sign up to follow shows, save episodes, and get the latest updates.
Select a country or region

Africa, Middle East, and India

Asia Pacific

Europe

Latin America and the Caribbean

The United States and Canada
OSZAR »